War Diaries (May 29) (nonfiction): Difference between revisions
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=== Henry L. Stimson: May 29, 1945 === | === Henry L. Stimson: May 29, 1945 === | ||
[[File:Secretary_of_War_Henry_Stimson,_evidently_arriving_at_the_White_House_for_a_Cabinet_meeting._-_NARA_-_199142.jpg|thumb|Henry L. Stimson arriving for a Truman cabinet meeting in August 1945.]] | |||
<blockquote> | <blockquote> | ||
I had in [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Grew Joe Grew] the Acting Secretary of State, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Forrestal Jim Forrestal] of the Navy, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Marshall <nowiki>[George]</nowiki> Marshall] the Chief of Staff, and some assistants of each one of them. This meeting was called by Grew on the suggestion of the President and its purpose was to decide upon an announcement to the Japanese which would serve as a warning for them to surrender or else have something worse happen to them. It was an awkward meeting because there were people present in the presence of whom I could not discuss the real feature which would govern the whole situation, namely S-1 [not everyone present knew of the top secret atomic bomb project]. We had hesitated just before they came in whether we should go on with the meeting at all on account of that feature but decided to let Grew, who was the one who really had gotten it up, go ahead with it. He had brought with him the proposed statement of the Secretary of State to the Japanese which had been drawn up in the[State] Department. He read it and then called for our comment. I told him that I was inclined to agree with giving the Japanese a modification of the unconditional surrender formula and some hope to induce them to practically make an unconditional surrender without the use of those words[i.e., without calling it "unconditional surrender", a phrase that might delay Japan from surrendering]. I told him that I thought the timing was wrong and that this was not the time to do it [the atomic bomb was not yet ready to use as a response should Japan reject the warning to surrender]. | I had in [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Grew Joe Grew] the Acting Secretary of State, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Forrestal Jim Forrestal] of the Navy, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Marshall <nowiki>[George]</nowiki> Marshall] the Chief of Staff, and some assistants of each one of them. This meeting was called by Grew on the suggestion of the President and its purpose was to decide upon an announcement to the Japanese which would serve as a warning for them to surrender or else have something worse happen to them. It was an awkward meeting because there were people present in the presence of whom I could not discuss the real feature which would govern the whole situation, namely S-1 [not everyone present knew of the top secret atomic bomb project]. We had hesitated just before they came in whether we should go on with the meeting at all on account of that feature but decided to let Grew, who was the one who really had gotten it up, go ahead with it. He had brought with him the proposed statement of the Secretary of State to the Japanese which had been drawn up in the[State] Department. He read it and then called for our comment. I told him that I was inclined to agree with giving the Japanese a modification of the unconditional surrender formula and some hope to induce them to practically make an unconditional surrender without the use of those words[i.e., without calling it "unconditional surrender", a phrase that might delay Japan from surrendering]. I told him that I thought the timing was wrong and that this was not the time to do it [the atomic bomb was not yet ready to use as a response should Japan reject the warning to surrender]. |
Latest revision as of 13:25, 29 May 2020
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Diaries
Bernard James Glynn: May 29, 1917
Rose 8:00 am. No flying clouds too low.
—Second Lieutenant Bernard James Glynn, Royal Flying Corps, Christ Church, Oxford, while serving at Sommes in France (diary).
Glynn was killed in action that day.
See War Diaries (December 17) for a letter Glynn wrote to his parents in 1916 to be sent only after his death, should he not survive the war.
- https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/those-who-served/diaries-letters-stories/first-world-war/glynn/letter
- https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/those-who-served/diaries-letters-stories/first-world-war/glynn
- https://livesofthefirstworldwar.iwm.org.uk/lifestory/1365930
Philip Mechanicus: May 29, 1943
It feels as though I’m an official reporter reporting on a shipwreck. We’re in a cyclone together, aware that the holed ship is sinking slowly and trying to reach a harbor, but this harbor seems far away. I’m slowly beginning to realize that I haven’t been brought here by my persecutors; I’m on this journey voluntarily to do my work. I’m busy all day long, not bored at all, sometimes I almost don’t even have enough time. Duty calls and labor is noble. I spend much of the day writing; sometimes, I start as early as 5:30 in the morning, sometimes I’m still at it after bedtime, summarizing my impressions or experiences of the day.
Philip Mechanicus, a journalist in his 50s, was arrested in September 1942 for not wearing a Star of David on a tram, and sent to Westerbork, a transit camp in the northeast Netherlands where many Jews were brought. Most were then sent on to Nazi concentration and extermination camps farther east in Poland, Germany and Austria. The diary of Mechanicus, published in English in 1968, documented camp life with precision. He often spoke of the transports, which left every Tuesday, carrying 1,000 to 3,000 people, to even harsher fates.
- Dutch War Diaries @ NY Times
George Beck: May 29, 1944
Whit Monday No news whatsoever to put down regarding the war. Today we went down to the pool for a swim. When one looks around as a prisoner, and sees all the young couples so carefree and happy, it makes one realise what he is missing. Five years ago now I was with Alice at Derby Races. Sometimes I think that this war will go on for years, I cannot see it ending at all. God knows what the reaction of this lot will be. It will be like starting all over again.
—George Beck,1st Battalion The Duke of Wellington's Regiment, prisoner of war (diary)
Henry L. Stimson: May 29, 1945
I had in Joe Grew the Acting Secretary of State, Jim Forrestal of the Navy, [George] Marshall the Chief of Staff, and some assistants of each one of them. This meeting was called by Grew on the suggestion of the President and its purpose was to decide upon an announcement to the Japanese which would serve as a warning for them to surrender or else have something worse happen to them. It was an awkward meeting because there were people present in the presence of whom I could not discuss the real feature which would govern the whole situation, namely S-1 [not everyone present knew of the top secret atomic bomb project]. We had hesitated just before they came in whether we should go on with the meeting at all on account of that feature but decided to let Grew, who was the one who really had gotten it up, go ahead with it. He had brought with him the proposed statement of the Secretary of State to the Japanese which had been drawn up in the[State] Department. He read it and then called for our comment. I told him that I was inclined to agree with giving the Japanese a modification of the unconditional surrender formula and some hope to induce them to practically make an unconditional surrender without the use of those words[i.e., without calling it "unconditional surrender", a phrase that might delay Japan from surrendering]. I told him that I thought the timing was wrong and that this was not the time to do it [the atomic bomb was not yet ready to use as a response should Japan reject the warning to surrender].
After a discussion around the table I was backed up by Marshall and then by everybody else. [Special Counsel to the President Samuel] Rosenman was there, [Assistant Sec. of War John] McCloy, [Director of the Office of War Information] Elmer Davis, Forrestal's legal adviser Mathias Correa, and Eugene Dooman who is the Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary of State [James] Dunn.
After that meeting was over Marshall and McCloy and I stayed and discussed the situation of Japan and what we should do in regard to S-1 and the application of it.
—Henry L. Stimson (diary)
S-1 refers to S-1 Executive Committee, a United States government entity during World War II responsible for the early stages of the Manhattan atomic bomb project.
In the News
Fiction cross-reference
Nonfiction cross-reference
- George Beck (nonfiction)
- Bernard J. Glynn (nonfiction)
- Philip Mechanicus (nonfiction)
- Henry L. Stimson (nonfiction)
- War (nonfiction)
- War Diaries (nonfiction)
External links
- https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/those-who-served/diaries-letters-stories/first-world-war/glynn/letter
- https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/those-who-served/diaries-letters-stories/first-world-war/glynn
- https://livesofthefirstworldwar.iwm.org.uk/lifestory/1365930
- Dutch War Diaries @ NY Times
- http://www.pegasusarchive.org/pow/george_beck1.htm
- http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/library/correspondence/stimson-henry/corr_diary_stimson.htm